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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
(ICC), IMPUNITY AND THE RISE OF A 




How has the ICC influenced Kenya’s politics following the naming 
of six prominent Kenyans in 2010 that the local media referred to as the 
‘Ocampo Six’, suspected masterminds of the 2007-2008 postelection 
violence? The entry by the ICC into Kenya’s violently disputed elections 
in 2007 unsettled Kenya’s political elite attuned to impunity so much that 
Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto presented a joint presidential candidacy 
during the 2013 elections under Jubilee coalition, cynically referred to as 
the “alliance of the accused”, so as to try and gain leverage over the ICC. 
An attempt by the ICC to accord justice to victims of atrocities committed 
during disputed elections in 2007, was the first frontal confrontation 
against impunity deeply entrenched in the country’s body politic owing to 
ethnicised politics, compromised judiciary and weak and even dysfunctional 
institutions. Kenya’s judiciary is yet to evolve into an independent institution 
following years of interference by the executive dating back to the one 
party autocracy. However, despite expectations among a section of Kenyan 
populace that the ICC would deliver justice to the victims of egregious 
human rights violations, this was not to be. The hope that the ICC would 
dent impunity normative in the body politic remains a mirage. Kenyatta 
and Ruto politically exploited their charges at the ICC and by so doing 
exacerbated ethnic polarisation. Confronted by an unprecedented legal 
hurdle, Kenyatta and Ruto formed an ethnic alliance, ascended to power 
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on a joint presidential ticket and reinforced ethnicity, a vector for political 
mobilisation and consequent violence since Kenya’s return to multiparty 
politics in 1991. Although instrumentalisation of ethnicity for political gain 
predates Kenya’s independence in 1963, the deleterious interface of ethnicity, 
contestation for power and economic opportunities gained a foothold under 
Jomo Kenyatta, Kenya’s first president (1963-1978) (Karimi and Ochieng 
1980). Since December 2010, when six Kenyan suspects were named as 
masterminds of the 2007-2008 postelection violence, the ICC remains 
an overarching variable in Kenya’s politics owing to elusive accountability 
for atrocities committed in the wake of the disputed presidential results in 
2007. 
The disputed 2013 presidential victory by Kenyatta and Ruto, at 
the time indicted by the ICC, raised questions pertaining to the rule of 
law, normative and inclusive politics based on accountability and probity 
that the 2010 Constitution was expected to make part of Kenya’s political 
culture. Implementation of the constitution has faced impediments 
since promulgation because Kenyatta, an offshoot of Kenya’s plutocracy, 
stands to lose in the event a reformed state comes into being. This sense 
of self-preservation is untenable because Kenya’s stability depends on 
establishment of the rule of law and justice. The collapse of Kenya’s two 
cases before the ICC, the first against Uhuru Kenyatta and the second 
against William Ruto and Joshua Sang, preceded by dropping of charges 
against three other suspects, is two pronged. It exposes deficiencies of the 
ICC, a legal as well as political institution. It also illustrates the vulnerability 
of the ICC before suspects that are powerful state actors. Such accused 
easily maximise control of state apparatus to torpedo the course of justice 
for victims of mass atrocities. Kenyans that initially invested confidence in 
the ICC as a dispenser of justice are forced to have second thoughts. 
Inability by both the local judiciary and the ICC to identify and 
prosecute masterminds of the 2007-2008 atrocities, poses a threat 
to Kenya’s democratisation process. As a Court of last resort, the ICC 
intervened because Kenya was unable and unwilling to try those liable for 
organising and perpetrating the violence. Lack of political will is linked to 
Kenya’s unresolved historical injustices such as political assassinations, state 
sponsored violence, land dispossession and related ethnic violence, economic 
crimes, and endemic corruption. The realisation of the constitution of Kenya 
2010 is a culmination of efforts for state restructure spanning the entire 
postcolonial period. The absence of political will poses the greatest threat to 
Kenya’s stability. Uhuru Kenyatta’s reluctance to facilitate implementation 
of the constitution and the Truth Justice and Reconciliation Commission 
(TJRC) report are illustrations of hostility against both retributive and 
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restorative justice. The report was submitted to Kenyatta in 2013 amid 
allegations of doctoring. The office of the president was accused of exerting 
pressure on local commissioners to expunge sections of the report that 
adversely implicated Jomo Kenyatta in historical land injustices across the 
country (The Star June 4 2013. To date the report lies in abeyance. Neither 
has the report been widely circulated to the public as stipulated by the law. 
The report presents a case of conflict of interest to Kenyatta, son of Kenya’s 
first president. The report adversely mentions Kenyatta and Ruto in relation 
to the 2007-2008 postelection violence although no recommendations 
were made against them (The Final Report of the TJRC of Kenya 2013; The 
Star June 3 2013).  
The notion that resolution of Kenya’s postcolonial upheavals might 
lie with the international community through institutions such as the ICC is 
misplaced. In fact such an approach could prove inimical to Kenya’s stability, 
a country historically sharply divided along ethnic lines. At the same time 
it can be argued that institutionalised impunity owing to blatant disregard 
for the rule of law and exploitation of violence for political and economic 
advantage poses a risk to Kenya’s stability unless checked. Impunity has 
entrenched a culture of violence in the country’s politics because those who 
engage in violence invariably get away with it. Insidiously they are rewarded 
with appointment or election to public office. Of concern is that Kenya’s 
judiciary has proven ineffective throughout the country’s independence. It 
is even complicit in the edification of impunity by focusing on crimes by 
poor and less influential people while ignoring crimes by high and mighty 
or even shielding such people from accountability despite evidence of errant 
behaviour. In what seems to be a grotesque inversion of events, the judiciary 
seems to protect the powerful from the powerless. Kenya’s democratisation 
is precarious because of lack of impartiality in the application of the rule of 
law. Despite some judicial reform following the post-election violence, the 
judiciary has not yet won wider appeal as a disinterested arbiter of political 
and other disputes because of corruption, tribalism and partisanship (IWPR 
April 17 2014).     
The article is seminal in the sense that it analyses the nexus of 
Kenya’s indigenous capital, spoils politics, violence and elusive justice. It 
shows how this linkage played itself out in international criminal justice 
and Kenya’s international relations following the naming of Kenyatta, Ruto 
and others as masterminds of crimes against humanity during the 2007-
2008 postelection violence. Kenya’s engagement with the ICC prominently 
thrust Kenya’s domestic politics into African and international politics 
owing to the indictment high profile politicians. Daniel Moi, Kenya’s second 
president and Jomo Kenyatta’s longest serving vice president, politically 
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mentored both the younger Kenyatta and Ruto. He inherited a one party 
autocracy, that he sustained through institutional collapse and deft 
manipulation of ethnicity. The joint presidential candidature of Kenyatta 
and Ruto was backed by Mwai Kibaki, Moi’s successor and vice for a decade. 
Unable to change Kenya’s political and economic trajectory, Kenya almost 
plunged into civil war under Kibaki over disputed presidential elections 
following heightened ethnic polarisation. Kenyatta-Moi-Kibaki political 
axis dominates Kenya’s politics and is the nucleus of local capital owing to 
its vast economic interests traversing the entire economic gamut. Kenya’s 
politics and economic control is in a grip of a tiny coterie of individuals 
related by blood, economic interests and more insidiously by their ability to 
mobilise ethnically for further economic and political gain. This plutocracy is 
impervious to accountability and wary of the ICC. In Kenya’s political system, 
the personal, here used to mean selfish economic interests, the communal 
and the political are intertwined and reinforce neopatrimonialism. In this 
polity, the political elite exploit local and communal anxieties, cultural 
differences, even primordial ones, and genuine concerns for personal gain. 
It was against this background that Kenyatta and Ruto easily mobilised 
their respective tribes against the ICC and opponents by turning personal 
legal woes into communal and then national threats and burdens. The two 
politicians were central to Moi’s ill-fated so-called generational transition in 
2002. Then Moi unsuccessfully tried to hoist Kenyatta, a political neophyte, 
on Kenyans as his successor. Although the ICC rendered the ethnic alliance 
between Kenyatta and Ruto a matter of political survival, Kenyatta and Ruto 
could easily enter into an entente ahead of the 2013 elections because both 
are of the ancien régime extraction (Shilaho 2013).   
The article highlights a treacherous terrain in which politics and 
international criminal justice coalesce. A legal analysis of the ICC with a 
specific focus on the Kenyan cases is not what this article is about. It is 
confined to the politics of the cases specifically the cynical manipulation 
of the cases by tribal barons at the expense of justice. The ICC legal threat 
made Kenya’s kleptocracy feel besieged. It compelled Kenyatta and Ruto, 
who were on opposing sides during the disputed 2007 elections, to form an 
ethnic alliance between Kikuyu and Kalenjin, their respective tribes. It did 
not matter that these politicians were indicted for allegedly mobilising gangs 
from their respective ethnic groups to commit atrocities against ‘enemy 
tribes’, in effect each other’s supporters, during the ensuing ethnic violence. 
Ruto was indicted for mobilising “Kalenjin warriors” to drive Kikuyu out 
of the Rift Valley region while Kenyatta was indicted for mobilising and 
sponsoring a rag tag Kikuyu militia, mungiki, to retaliate against opposition 
supporters, who included members of Luhya, Luo and Kalenjin ethnic 
54
The International Criminal Court (ICC), impunity and the rise of a siege mentality 
among Kenya’s kleptocracy
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Porto Alegre | v.2, n.3 | p. 50-73 | Jan./Jun. 2017
groups in Naivasha and other Kikuyu dominated parts of the Rift Valley. 
Consequently the two were separately charged as co-perpetrators in crimes 
that included organising and financing murder, displacement, persecution, 
rape and other inhuman acts committed during the post-election violence 
(ICC 2015a; ICC 2013b). 
Victory for Kenyatta and Ruto during the 2013 elections was 
indispensable. It was required to salvage their political careers, evade possible 
incarceration and defend the economic and political interests of Kenya’s 
plutocracy. A combination of these three factors trumped the Constitution, 
and specifically Chapter six on leadership and integrity that demanded high 
moral and ethical standards for those aspiring for and occupying public 
office. Once the high court and electoral body cleared Kenyatta and Ruto 
to vie for the highest office in the land despite facing egregious criminal 
charges, the moral bar that the constitution was expected to instil in the 
country’s politics and public life did not see the light of day. 
In the second section, I argue that Kenyan politics thrives on personal 
rule logic that undergirds politics across Africa. The ICC politics dovetailed 
with ethnicity to determine the outcome of Kenya’s 2013 elections3. The 
section does not intend to portray Kenya and Africa as undifferentiated but 
to underscore the notion that the individual operates within the communal 
and this largely affects politics in Sub-Saharan African. It is for this reason 
that Kenyan politicians are able to mobilise along tribal fault lines to win 
elections and even evade justice. Save for South Africa, to name but one, 
African polities are largely rural, and peasantry.  Consequently, workers 
and peasants seem to lack consciousness to mobilise along crosscutting 
interests and challenge the predatory political elite. The influence of kinship 
politics characterised by clanism, ethnicity, regionalism and religion trumps 
horizontal political organisation and mobilisation. The fusion of society and 
state makes it hard for politics to be organised along crosscutting interests. 
This logic puts into perspective the controversial ascendancy of Kenyatta 
and Ruto to power despite facing criminal charges before the ICC.
In Kenya, a culture of impunity is deeply entrenched as seen 
through lack of political will to prosecute those responsible for vicious 
cyclic tribal violence in the 1990s and specifically the masterminds of the 
2007-2008 atrocities. The ICC intervened in Kenya under the principle of 
complementarity, because Kenya was “unable and unwilling” to prosecute 
high ranking state officials implicated in atrocities committed during the 
2007-2008 postelection violence in which an estimated 1 333 people were 
killed and over 600 000 displaced (Republic of Kenya 2008a). Even among 
3 For a nuanced analysis of Kenya’s 2013 elections see Shilaho 2013.
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the low and middle level perpetrators none has been prosecuted (Brown and 
Sriram 2012; Human Rights Watch 2011). 
In the subsequent sections, I focus on the nexus between politics 
and international criminal justice, the Kenyan situation at the ICC and 
highlight duplicity among Kenya’s politicians through a Special Tribunal for 
Kenya versus The Hague debate. Initially some politicians publicly expressed 
preference for the ICC option, including Ruto. Some of these politicians 
even voted against and defeated an amendment bill, and effectively the 
Special Tribunal for Kenya Bill. The bill would have anchored the tribunal in 
the Constitution to cushion it against executive manipulation. Opponents of 
a local mechanism for resolution of the conflict expediently changed tune 
and identified scapegoats once the ICC swung into action. They accused 
the Court of imperial tendencies and meddling in Kenya’s internal affairs, 
thus its sovereignty. In Kenya’s deeply ethnically divided society, “truth” 
concerning the narrative of the post-election violence was lost during the 
2013 elections campaigns that, like previous ones, specifically since the 
advent of multiparty politics, dangerously split the country into ethnic 
enclaves. So highly politicised did the ICC cases become that the question 
of justice for victims became disputable, if not, non-existent in the whole 
controversy. 
The Logic of African Politics
According to Chabal and Daloz (1999) the importance of vertical 
links and the notion of the individual are salient in African politics. In the 
estimation of the two Africanists, the individual rationality in Sub-Saharan 
African polities is based on the communal logic. This means that in as 
much as Africans act in their individual capacities, their behaviour is greatly 
influenced by the mores, values and norms of the communities in which 
they exist. It is for this reason that Chabal and Daloz observed that students 
of African politics cannot understand how politics operates in Africa sui 
generis, in and of itself, divorced from the rest of the society. This is because 
African polities have their own logic even if it appears perverse and inimical 
to people’s wellbeing. The communal logic entails political behaviour 
that citizens in consolidated democracies would not easily understand 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999: 155). Firstly, the individual acts in concert with 
the psychological, social and religious foundations of the local community. 
Secondly, relations of power in Africa depend on a shared notion that the 
political is communal (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 156). This explains why 
democracy and multiparty elections are seen in the context of communal 
rather than individual mould characterised by competing manifestos and 
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visions for a country. These manifestos are elaborate on issues concerning the 
electorate but even these are read through the prism of tribal, clan, regional 
and religious fault lines. Kenya’s elections reflect tribal voting patterns 
akin to an ethnic census since kinship and tribal ties override cross cutting 
social, political and economic concerns (Shilaho 2014). Once a politician 
has the command of his ethnic group, he considers himself or herself as 
influential in national politics on that very basis but not on the strength of 
their programmatic politics. Superficially, the controversial results of the 
2013 elections despite crimes against humanity charges against Kenyatta 
and Ruto would imply that majority of Kenya’s voted against their interests 
by disregarding questions of probity, accountability and justice. However, 
the link between the personal, the communal and the national in this polity 
illuminates the outcome of the 2013 elections. 
The intention here is not to allude to a herd mentality among Kenyan 
voters and overlook the role of manifestos and policies. The argument is 
that even economic and social concerns are aggregated along ethno-regional 
fault-lines and invariably the ethnic affiliations of  candidates, especially 
presidential ones, matter more than the issues they purport to champion. 
The ethnicity factor remains overarching during presidential elections in 
spite of devolution of some power and resources to the periphery, county 
governments, under the 2010 Constitution because the centre has not 
sought to de-ethnise the politics (Shilaho 2015). Regionalism, that in 
most cases overlaps with ethnicity, and religion are other axes for political 
mobilisation. Hyden argues that the salience of “community-centred 
networks” in African politics stems from the inability of class-based identity 
politics to emerge and dislodge kinship ties (Hyden 2006: 55). Jackson and 
Rosberg (1984: 421) identify such a political system as personal rule defined 
as “a distinctive type of political system in which the rivalries and struggles 
of powerful and wilful men, rather than impersonal institutions, ideologies, 
personal policies, or class interests, are fundamental in shaping political 
life”.
Chabal and Daloz (1999: 158) argue that the act of voting in 
multiparty elections must be seen as part of informal relations of political 
exchange that has a direct bearing on the results. The electorate vote for ‘one 
of their own’, that is, an ethno-regional presidential candidate in anticipation 
of disproportionately benefiting from public goods colloquially referred to 
as “development” or “national cake” in Kenya’s political parlance once he 
or she ascends to power. Although Africa’s politics is mostly affected by 
vertical links, this is not unique to Africa. What distinguishes Africa is that 
this is a compelling factor,
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What is significant in Africa is the extent to which vertical and/or 
personalised, relations actually drive the very logic of political system. It 
is not just that politics are swayed by personal considerations or that the 
personal is manipulated for political reasons. It is also, and perhaps more 
importantly, that the overall aim of politics is to affect the nature of such 
personal relations (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 158). 
The ICC, Neopatrimonialism and Tribal Mobilisation
Owing to the influence of neopatrimonialism, it was not possible 
for Kenyan politicians to regard the ICC cases as strictly legal issues. This 
does not imply that the ICC is a purely legal institution. Being a multilateral 
institution and given that the Rome Statute allows the United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) to refer cases to the ICC and defer those before 
it, it is untenable to describe the ICC as a purely legal institution. Kenya, 
a country in which politics is not institutionalised, politicians cynically 
invoke identity, and specifically, ethnicity, to plead victimhood and evade 
accountability. Unchecked for long, the practice has precipitated institutional 
atrophy and endemic impunity. Kenyatta, Ruto and supporters accused the 
ICC of targeting Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups. They reduced the 2013 
elections to a referendum on the ICC. They interpreted their victory as 
repudiation of the ICC and assertion of Kenya’s sovereignty. 
The two politicians easily mobilised ethnically because the society 
spills over into the state. Tribalism coupled with patronage-clientelism, 
a variant of neopatrimonialism, defines Kenya’s political system. In 
neopatrimonialism, the patron or “Big Man” often the president, exercises 
authority through rewards to his clients. These clients are the “Big Man’s” 
supporters whose influence and power are hinged on loyalty to the “Big 
Man” and ethno-regionalism. They prop up the “Big Man” through 
mobilisation of co-ethnics to vote for the incumbent or a rival in case of a 
fall out with the incumbent and defend the regime no matter what. Rewards 
come in the form of appointments in the bureaucracy, extraction of rents 
through government tenders and even the right to act with impunity. This 
political behaviour is also known as prebendalism (van de Walle 1994: 
133-134; Hyden 2006: 102). In the Kenyan political context, these rewards 
almost exclusively go to allies from the president’s ethnic group pivotal in 
defending one of “our own” against losing power to “enemy” tribes. 
Rent Seeking and Accountability
Rent seeking is the raison d’etre of spoils politics and refers to a 
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situation in which the ruler, in concert with a clique of allies, take advantage 
of control of the state to illicitly benefit themselves through prebends (van 
de Walle 1994: 133-134; Widner 1994: 53).  Neopatrimonialism nurtures 
impunity, entrenches patronage, corruption and undermines the rule of 
law thus rendering state institutions dysfunctional since it thrives on a rigid 
dichotomy of “Big Men-Little People” (Russell 1999). The cumulative effect 
of this divide on democratic consolidation in Kenya is deleterious. “Big Men” 
and their allies maintain a grip on power, perpetrate rent-seeking politics 
and act with impunity as they balkanise the polity into tribal enclaves. A 
sense of false consciousness makes the poor to think that tribal politics is 
beneficial to them and cannot mobilise collectively to enforce accountability 
on predatory politicians (Jackson and Rosberg 1984).   
Expounding on the personal rule logic, Chabal and Daloz (1999: 
161) are of the view that ultimately the legitimacy of neopatrimonialism 
depends on the ability of the “Big Man” to deliver on expectations of clients 
in micro-networks of patronage and clientelism. The national good is 
subsumed under the immediate gratification of the clients at the expense 
of development programmes. The “Big Man’s” continued stay at the helm 
depends on the sustenance of these networks even if they cause adverse 
economic consequences including poverty for the rest of the society 
(Chabal and Daloz 1999: 161).  The one party statism was defined by state 
personalisation and privatisation of the economy. The corollary was removal 
of oversight bodies to check excesses attendant to exercise of power by 
the “Big Man” who officially carried the designation, president. Despite a 
shift from single party to multiparty politics, the one party rule legacy still 
influences Kenya’s politics. Attributes of this legacy include criminalisation 
of basic freedoms such as freedom of expression, assembly, protest and 
disregard for the rule of law. As such, Kenya’s polity is archetypal of the 
unique communal logic that undergirds sub-Saharan African politics. 
South Africa’s history of apartheid and the presence of a significant white 
population in the country make it untenable to analyse its politics in the 
same prism as the other countries in this region. The inability of Kenya 
to organise politics along cross cutting interests has seen the evolution of 
politicised ethnicity into the ideology of “tribalism” that renders institutions 
germane for a functioning democracy dysfunctional. 
Personal rule defined Africa’s autocratic single party rule and military 
dictatorships and still holds sway in Kenya under multiparty politics because 
of continued informalisation rather than institutionalisation of politics. 
It is inconceivable that in a rational legal authority, a person accused of 
crimes against humanity charges could be eligible to stand as a presidential 
candidate, let alone a controversial victory by a joint presidential ticket by 
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two ICC indictees. Such charges would most likely deal a death knell to 
the political career of the accused in a polity informed by the rule of law 
and normative leadership. A rational legal authority is the polar opposite of 
personal rule. The former is a polity in which “the public sphere is carefully 
distinguished from the private sphere; written laws and bureaucratic 
institutions routinise the exercise of authority and protect individuals and 
their property from the whims of capricious leaders” (Bratton and van de 
Walle 1997: 62).
The ICC and its Disputed Legitimacy 
The Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, international criminal tribunals, 
such as the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), The Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) or Cambodia Tribunal or Khmer Rouge 
Tribunal among other judicial processes preceded the permanent legal 
institution, International Criminal Court (ICC). The Nuremberg and 
Tokyo trials showed that international criminal justice helps in securing 
peace by delegitimizing and incapacitating spoilers. The flipside is that 
this very aspect of international criminal justice makes the ICC a portent 
instrument of warfare that escalates rather than mitigates conflict (Nouwen 
2013: 177). Kastner shares the same position and observes that the ICC “… 
has the potential to contribute to ending grave crimes but also bears the 
danger of prolonging a conflict by adding to the insecurity of the warring 
parties” (Kastner 2010: 134). Nouwen argues that the ICC judicial system 
is inherently flawed in the sense that unlike the Nuremberg and Tokyo 
Tribunals, the ICC does not deal with those who have been vanquished thus 
providing a battlefield over which protagonists seek to defeat one another 
(Nouwen 2013: 177). 
The ICC allowed the two indictees to pursue their political ends 
as long as they met their obligations as suspects. It reduced the cases to a 
political duel among ethnically fragmented politicians. The Court did not 
remove suspects and later the accused from Kenya’s political matrix under 
the premise that its jurisdiction was restricted to the legal but not politics of 
the disputed presidential elections. The 2013 elections therefore provided yet 
another stage for ethno-regional political elite to contest for power against 
a background of the unfinished business of the 2007 disputed elections. 
Kenyatta and Ruto framed the ICC and their main presidential challenger, 
Raila Odinga as enemies of Kenya’s sovereignty. They accused Odinga 
of working in concert with a section of civil society and ‘imperialists’ to 
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fabricate charges against them. By adhering to the Rome Statute, the ICC 
inadvertently accelerated rather than lowered the tensions in the country’s 
politics. However, had the ICC removed the two from the local political scene 
it would have inflamed passions among their supporters. It was a catch 22 
Situation. It was consistent with the Rome Treaty for suspects and accused 
persons to be free as long as they honoured summonses and had no arrest 
warrants against them. However, never before had indicted persons before 
the ICC been let free until they were acquitted or allowed to attend court 
proceeding via video link underscoring the fact that the ICC is influenced 
by geopolitics. 
The Rome Statute that provides a legal framework for the ICC 
came into effect on July 1 2002, and like most laws, does not apply 
retroactively. Significantly, the AU’s 2004-2005 Strategic Plan underscores 
commitment to ensure ratification of the Rome Treaty by all AU member 
states (Coalition for the International Criminal Court-CICC, n.d.). Indeed 
the AU Constitutive Act Article 4(h) recognises intervention amidst grave 
human rights violations in a member state. It reads thus, “the right of 
the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the 
Assembly in respect grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide 
and crimes against humanity” (Constitutive Act of the African Union 
2000). Kenya voluntarily signed the Rome Statute in 1999 and ratified it 
in 2005 thus becoming the 98th State Party. Kenya domesticated the Rome 
Statute through International Crimes Act 2008, effectively becoming part 
of Kenya’s laws (Republic of Kenya 2008b). The ICC was set up to try the 
masterminds of egregious crimes including war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. These are often too powerful to be tried by judicial 
systems in their respective countries (Roth 2014). Unlike previous ad hoc 
UN tribunals, the ICC is “…a permanent infrastructure with the ability to 
monitor crimes and act accordingly as the need arises” (Musila 2009: 12). 
It targets the powerful since suspects of crimes under the Rome Statute 
jurisdiction are influential state actors and warlords that have the capacity 
to compromise national judicial systems.
The ICC addresses mass atrocities committed by individuals. To avoid 
prosecution ruthless national leaders too often threaten, corrupt or 
compromise judges and prosecutors at home, but those in The Hague 
should be beyond the reach of such obstructionism. The ICC is meant 
as a Court of last resort for victims and survivors who cannot find justice 
in their own country and as a deterrent to leaders who have little to fear 
from domestic prosecution (Roth 2014). 
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A Clash between the ICC and ‘Africa’
The ICC is perennially on a collision course with most African rulers 
primarily because it targets prominent state actors and non-state actors 
and most of the atrocities under its jurisdiction disproportionately occur 
in Africa principally owing to weak states characterised by institutional 
atrophy, tribal politics, and local judiciaries too compromised to impartially 
dispense justice thus pervasive impunity. Fundamentally, the legacy of 
slavery, colonialism, and apartheid makes some Africans suspicious of 
the intentions of multilateral bodies dominated by Westerners the ICC 
inclusive. In recent memory, before the ICC came into being, grave atrocities 
seemed to be concentrated in Latin America under military juntas and then 
Eastern Europe most evocatively in the Balkans in the early 1990s. Despite 
the preponderance of weak judiciaries that are no more than appendages 
of the executive, African rulers accuse the ICC of unfairly targeting them 
while ignoring atrocities elsewhere in the world. The accusation evokes the 
spectre of imperialism and encroachment on the sovereignty of African 
countries by an institution that these politicians regard as an adjunct of the 
West to keep them in check. It is trite that sovereignty is not an absolute 
otherwise there would be no need for international instruments and norms. 
‘Sovereignty as responsibility’ is the norm in international relations. ‘This 
means that where large numbers of populations suffer extreme deprivation 
and are threatened with death, the international community-obligated by 
normative standards of humanitarian and human rights-cannot be expected 
to watch passively and do not respond. Humanitarian intervention then 
becomes imperative (Deng 2010: 354). 
The accusation that the ICC is biased against African rulers is half 
the truth. Of the 124 members of the Assembly of States Parties, countries 
that have ratified the Rome Statute 34 are African states, forming the largest 
bloc. African judges serve within the Court. Africa is also represented 
by officials in the Office of the Chief Prosecutor headed by a Gambian, 
Fatou Bensouda. As such, the ICC can hardly be described as anti-African 
institution based on its composition (Roth 2014). Moreover, more than 
800 civil society groups from Africa are members of the Coalition for 
the International Criminal Court (CICC) that translates into one third of 
its global membership (CICC n.d). Importantly, victims of atrocities and 
human rights groups in Africa support the intervention by the ICC in Africa 
since it creates hope for justice that is elusive in local judiciaries (HRW 
2014; Roth 2014).
Proponents of the ICC intervention in African conflicts cite these 
facts to dispute the notion that the Court was formed with rogue African 
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states in mind. Out of the nine African situations, that is, African countries 
whose citizens currently cases before the ICC, have had before or on whose 
soil the crimes within the ambit of the ICC jurisdiction were committed, 
five are self-referral in the sense that the state in question asked the Court 
to intervene. The wholesale dismissal of the Court as an imperial institution 
is political. However, the ICC has not been enthusiastic in dealing with 
mass atrocities in other parts of the world such as Palestine/Israel, Sri 
Lanka, Myanmar and Iraq thus lending credibility to its critics. Self-referral 
situations are Uganda, Mali, Central African Republic (CAR) I and II 
and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). But self-referral cases do 
not necessarily mean the states concerned are supportive of international 
criminal justice. These self-referral cases involve rebels fighting against 
governments and so do not necessarily indicate confidence in the Court 
by the governments in question (Simmons and Danner 2009: 243). The 
duplicity with which some Africa rulers relate to the Court is indicative 
of self-preservation rather than confidence in the ICC. In referring cases 
involving rebels to the Court, the government runs the risk of having its 
officials investigated and prosecuted as well thus the word “Situation” refers 
to the whole gamut of the conflict as opposed to individual cases of wrong 
doing (Simmons and Danner 2010: 230-231). 
Yoweri Museveni referred ringleaders of the Lord’s Resistance 
Army (LRA), a terror ragtag army that for years committed atrocities in 
northern Uganda, to the ICC and had LRA’s commander Dominic Ongwen 
handed over to the ICC in 2015 upon surrendering. However, Museveni was 
not keen on the Court investigating atrocities by Uganda People’s Defence 
Force (UPDF). He was Uhuru Kenyatta’s most vociferous backer in the 
latter’s tirades against the Court and is one of the most acerbic critics of the 
institution. He is on record having described the ICC as “a bunch of useless 
people” (BBC News May 12, 2016).
The Darfur, Sudan and Libya situations are exceptions because the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) referred them to the Court as 
permitted by the Rome Statute (Hoile 2014: 66-67). In principle, the ICC 
has jurisdiction over a crime committed by a citizen of a member state or 
on the territory of a member state or if the situation is referred to the Court 
by the UNSC (Roth 2014). This, in effect, means the ICC “may potentially 
assume jurisdiction over war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide 
committed anywhere in the world” (Kastner 2010: 131). Kenya was the first 
country in which the ICC Chief Prosecutor initiated investigations on his 
own volition under the proprio motu powers granted by Article 15(3) of the 
Rome Statute that allows the Prosecutor to initiate an investigation without 
a referral to the State Party or the UNSC (Rome Statute of International 
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Criminal Court 2002; Hoile 2014: 312). Ivory Coast was the second such 
situation. However, the ICC critics observe that European countries are the 
greatest funders of the ICC that gives them leverage over the Court and this 
calls into question its impartiality (Hoile 2014: 15-18, 37). Critics take issue 
the three veto wielding members of UNSC, that is the US, Russia and China 
for having the power to refer cases to the ICC, as part of the Permanent 5 
(P5), yet do not recognise the ICC since they have not ratified the Rome 
Statute. Furthermore, although most European countries are signatories to 
the Rome Treaty, the fact that major nations such as Russia, Israel, China 
and India are not, denies the Court international legitimacy and emboldens 
critics’ accusation of selective justice. 
The Kenyan Cases before the ICC
Kenya and most other African countries ratified the Rome Statute 
apparently as an expression of aversion against impunity and affirmation of 
the rule of law. 
In 2005, the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights issued 
a resolution on ending impunity in Africa and on the domestication and 
implementation of the Rome Statute of the ICC. It called on civil society 
organisations in Africa to work together and develop partnerships that 
further respect the rule of law internationally and strengthen the Statute 
(CICC n.d.). 
Kenya’s successive governments beginning with that of Mwai 
Kibaki and then Uhuru Kenyatta, tried to have cases facing Kenyan suspects 
either deferred or terminated. The AU launched a strident attack against 
the Court that threw the credibility and legitimacy of the court into doubt. 
Kenya ratified the Rome Statute against a background of its post-colonial 
history characterised by a culture of impunity. Political assassinations, state 
violence, politically instigated ethnic violence, extrajudicial executions, 
land grabbing and official grand larceny blot Kenya’s post-colonial period 
but the masterminds and perpetrators did not face justice (Kenya Human 
Rights Commission (KHRC) 1998; KHRC 2011; Republic of Kenya 1992; 
1999; 2008a; 2008c). The Rome Statute finds expression in Kenya’s laws 
under International Crimes Act (Republic of Kenya 2010; Republic of Kenya 
2008b). Significantly, Kenya’s laws do not accord immunity to the country’s 
president accused of crimes covered by the Rome Treaty under Article 143(4) 
of the Constitution of Kenya (Republic of Kenya 2010: 88-89). 
Kenya’s cases at the ICC highlighted the fact that the institution has 
a delicate balancing act to do in navigating a dicey terrain of politics, the 
64
The International Criminal Court (ICC), impunity and the rise of a siege mentality 
among Kenya’s kleptocracy
Brazilian Journal of African Studies
Porto Alegre | v.2, n.3 | p. 50-73 | Jan./Jun. 2017
law and geostrategic interests in an attempt to ensure justice for victims of 
mass atrocities in Africa. It is instructive that since inception in 2002, the 
ICC has convicted only nine suspects, warlords and a former vice president 
of Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) an indication that international 
criminal justice is skewed, intractable, protracted and expensive, financially 
and emotionally. 
The ICC is likely to lose confidence among Kenyan and other victims 
following its inability to successfully prosecute suspected masterminds of 
the 2007-2008 post-election violence. Although Kenyatta had the dubious 
distinction as the first sitting president to appear before the Court when he 
was summoned for a “status conference” in October 2014, the withdrawal 
of charges against him in December 2014 and subsequently against Ruto in 
April 2016 for lack of sufficient evidence to ensure successful prosecutions 
is two pronged. It dampens hopes of the victims of ever finding justice. It 
also implies that state power indeed provides ammunition with which to 
fight against the Court since most of the witnesses inexplicably recanted 
their testimonies while potential ones, ring leaders of the mungiki militia, 
died through extrajudicial executions or were disappeared. These people 
attended a State House meeting and other meetings in which retaliatory 
attacks against opposition supporters were planned (ICC 2015b). The judges 
and prosecutor decried witness tampering in the Ruto case as well (KHRC 
April 7 2017). A climate of witness interference in which the government 
was implicated contributed to the collapse of the two cases besides loopholes 
in investigations carried out by the prosecutor’s office under  Luis Moreno-
Ocampo. Human Rights Watch observed that, “with the Kenyatta case 
closed, the scope of justice the ICC can deliver to Kenya’s victims is greatly 
reduced” (HRW 2014). Witness interference in the William Ruto case 
compelled the Court to issue arrest warrants against three Kenyans (ICC 
2015c; ICC 2013a). Worth noting is that the ICC vacated charges against 
Kenyatta, Ruto and his co accused, Sang, but did not acquit them. It means 
that in the event new evidence is found in both cases the charges could be 
reinstated. This inconclusiveness of the cases and resolution of the 2007-
2008 postelection violence cements the ICC in Kenya’s politics for years to 
come.
A Local Tribunal versus The ICC 
Kenyatta and Ruto voted for a constitutional amendment bill meant 
to facilitate the formation of a special tribunal in February 2009. However, 
with the benefit of hindsight, they were not committed to a local resolution 
to the 2007-2008 post-election atrocities. Before he was indicted, Ruto 
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publicly expressed preference for The Hague judicial process as opposed 
to a special tribunal (The Standard April 5 2011). MPs allied to him and 
predominantly Kalenjin in ethnic affiliation and drawn from the Rift Valley 
region, voted against and defeated the motion while singing in rhyme, 
“Don’t be Vague, let’s go to The Hague” (Standard Digital February 16 
2012). Kenyatta’s fellow Kikuyu allies, almost exclusively from Mount Kenya 
region, also voted against the bill (The Star March 12 2011). These politicians 
and civil society preferred the ICC option but for different reasons. Civil 
society argued that the government had neither the capacity nor political 
will to set up a credible special tribunal while Ruto and his supporters feared 
that such a tribunal would be biased against them. At the time, Ruto had not 
closed ranks with Kenyatta and Kibaki having been on the opposing sides 
of the 2007 electoral contest, and thus the post-election violence. He feared 
that a tribunal would be turned into a witch-hunt having been unofficially 
widely adversely mentioned as the mastermind of atrocities against Kikuyu 
resident in the Rift Valley region. So strong were the allegations that Ruto 
voluntarily travelled to The Hague but was unsuccessful in meeting the 
Chief Prosecutor to “clear his name” and possibly pre-empt being named 
among the suspected masterminds of the violence (CapitalNews November 
4 2010). 
Mutual suspicion among Kenya’s political elite and a legacy of 
impunity paved the way for the ICC intervention in Kenya’s conflict. Ruto 
and allies preferred the ICC not so much because they believed in the rule 
of law and justice for victims of the 2007-2008 postelection violence as 
because they thought that it would take as long as “ninety years” before 
the cases were concluded. Ruto was on record as saying that by that time 
“we shall all be dead” (Daily Nation October 16 2013). Kenyatta, Kibaki and 
supporters imagined that the ICC would implicate Raila Odinga and other 
prominent Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) party politicians for 
having called for mass action in protest against what they described as a 
stolen presidential victory. This politics of recrimination, suspicion, blame 
casting and expediency saw mass action, a constitutionally guaranteed form 
of protest, criminalised. Blame shifting played itself out during Ruto’s trial. 
Through his defence, Ruto tried to shift blame and responsibility to Kibaki 
with regard to the 2007-2008 postelection violence. He accused Kibaki 
of polarising the country through tribalism after he ascended to power in 
2002 that snowballed into violence in 2007-2008 (Daily Nation October 
31 2013). Furthermore, through his defence and then close ally Charles 
Keter, Ruto accused some officials in the government in which he serves as 
Deputy President, carryovers of the Kibaki administration, of scouting for 
witnesses, bribing and coaching them so as to testify against Ruto before 
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the Waki commission and then at the ICC (CapitalNews October 16 2013). 
An ally of Kenyatta, a loquacious and divisive fellow Kikuyu, Moses 
Kuria, sensationally publicly confessed in 2015 that he and a hawk, a 
presidential candidate in 2013 and Kibaki hatchet woman, Martha Karua, 
procured and coached ICC witnesses against Ruto (CapitalNews September 
24 2015). Hence politicians’ support for The Hague was neither about 
justice for the victims of the atrocities nor aversion against impunity. Ruto 
and supporters feared being implicated in the post-election crimes and so 
hoped to buy time through the ICC judicial process while Kibaki, Kenyatta 
and their supporters hoped that the ICC would implicate their opponents in 
the ODM. The ICC seemed to have been aware of this undercurrent politics. 
Thus it was even handed in its indictment in the sense that of the “Ocampo 
six” three were from each side of the political divide during the 2007 
electoral contest. This decision also seemed more political than purely legal 
and its zero conviction rate in Kenya underscores the view. Thereafter the 
Court indicted four, two from each side following confirmation of charges 
hearings. This aroused panic and catalysed the closing of ranks by erstwhile 
ethnic rivals, Kalenjin and Kikuyu. 
Conclusion
The ICC was initially hailed across Kenya’s ethnic divide as a welcome 
intervention in the country’s violently disputed presidential elections in 
2007. However, Kenyatta and Ruto as ethno-regional “Big Men”, exploited 
their influence in their respective ethnic groups, Kikuyu and Kalenjin, to whip 
up ethnic sentiment and mobilise against the ICC and their local political 
rivals. Once in power, they took advantage of control of state apparatus as 
leverage over the ICC. The result was derailment of justice for the victims 
of the 2007-2008 postelection violence. The Kenyan cases demonstrated 
how difficult it is for the ICC to operate in a polity in which impunity 
and tribalism hold sway.  For the first time, Kenya’s kleptocracy appeared 
vulnerable before a judicial system they could not directly influence and 
interfere with. However, the collapse of both cases affirmed its capacity to 
fight back and extricate itself from the jaws of international criminal justice 
and trump efforts towards attainment of sustainable peace, justice, healing 
and reconciliation. Although the Rome Statute established the ICC as a legal 
institution to address the highest forms of crimes that is war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and genocide, the Court has to grapple with realpolitik. 
The controversial election of Kenyatta and Ruto into the presidency, while 
indicted, the first the world over, exposed the limitations of the ICC until 
then viewed not only in Kenya but also elsewhere as the bulwark against 
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impunity. The less impressive record of the ICC in convicting suspects 
since inception in 2002 was underscored in the Kenyan cases following 
non-confirmation of charges, and dropping of charges. As such, there is 
likelihood that victims of atrocities may lose confidence in the Court leaving 
them with no recourse for justice especially in Africa characterised by weak 
and dysfunctional judicial systems.   
The challenge that Kenya faces is inability to institutionalise 
compromise and remove zero sum politics from elections. The rule of 
law must inform Kenya’s public life to ensure resolution of long standing 
disputes some of whose seeds lie in the colonial period while others were 
sowed and nurtured in the immediate postcolonial period by Jomo Kenyatta’s 
continued ethnicisation of the state. As evidenced by the results of the 2013 
elections that polarised the country further, it is a daunting challenge. 
Uhuru Kenyatta, a scion of Kenyatta and the core of Kenya’s plutocracy and 
Ruto have no capacity to lead in issues of justice, healing, and reconciliation 
since they ascended to power on an ethno-regional political axis for self-
preservation, that is, to insulate themselves from prosecution. The two are 
political creatures and beneficiaries of a political system that stands in need 
of reform and so have neither the political will nor incentive to transform it. 
Once more, the 2013 elections underscored the fact that Kenya is so tribally 
balkanised that it lacks collective norms, and a sense of national identity to 
guide citizens in electing leaders. 
The political elite reify ethnic differences and avariciously exploit 
them since it is almost impossible for them to be held to account as they 
pursue rent-seeking opportunities and engage in corruption while shielding 
under the idiom of tribalism. What appears as anachronistic political 
behaviour coexists with modernity. Kenya’s democratisation process has 
to contend with a self-replicating plutocratic dynasty with vested interests 
in the status quo. The international criminal justice system is retributive 
and so cannot reform Kenya’s moral fabric and by extension its flawed 
politics. That responsibility lies with Kenyans who first have to identify 
along cross cutting challenges of poverty, unemployment, poor quality 
of public services, lack of infrastructural facilities, insecurity and identify 
leadership concerned with their collective wellbeing as opposed to parochial 
self-interest couched under tribalism. Transcendence from retrogressive 
primordial politics steeped in ethnicity, regionalism and even religion is 
sine qua non of holding opportunistic and cynical political elite to account. 
Expectations concerning what the ICC could achieve were ambitious 
and reminiscent of a people that felt hopeless with regard to the ability of the 
local judiciary to prosecute a rogue political elite but who schizophrenically 
hoped that the ICC would “fix” politicians from the “enemy” tribe. For 
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practical and logistical reasons, the ICC can only do so much in Kenyans’ 
quest for justice and nation building. In fact it could pose a risk to the fragile 
state by inadvertently getting enmeshed in ethnic divisions. The collapse of 
the cases against Kenyatta, Ruto and Sang preceded by dropping of charges 
against three of the “Ocampo six” exposes limitations of a legalistic approach 
to Kenya’s political challenges. What is required is remedial of Kenya’s 
flawed national character through implementation of reform envisaged 
under the 2010 constitutional dispensation to ensure ethnic inclusivity and 
long-term political stability a challenge that requires leadership inspired by 
the imaginary of Kenya’s oneness that is currently lacking. The oligarchy 
has the capacity to impede justice by canvassing support locally through 
expedient ethnic alliances, across Africa and internationally against the ICC. 
This spurious form of Pan Africanism entrenches impunity at the expense 
of victims of mass atrocities in Africa. Retributive justice might be inimical 
to Kenya’s social cohesion but a deeply entrenched culture of impunity 
that has reproduced violence throughout the country’s post-colonial period 
could easily result in state collapse.
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ABSTRACT
Did the entry by the International Criminal Court (ICC) into the 2007-2008 
postelection dispute ruffle feathers among Kenya’s politicians and influence the 
results of the 2013 elections? This article argues that the indictment of prominent 
Kenyans by the ICC for atrocities committed during the postelection violence was the 
first attempt to break a vicious cycle of impunity deeply entrenched in the country’s 
body politic. However, the indictees exploited cases against them to exacerbate 
ethnic fault lines, polarise the country and ensure the controversial victory by Uhuru 
Kenyatta and William Ruto during the 2013 elections despite facing egregious 
charges before the ICC. Crucially, the ICC precipitated uncertainty and trepidation 
among Kenya’s kleptocrats in power since 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence. 
Kenyatta’s controversial presidential victory in 2013 was both personal and oligarchic 
as it ensured continued stranglehold on Kenya’s political and economic spheres 
by a self-reporuding plutocracy. With control of state apparatus, Kenyatta and Ruto 
successfully fought back against the threat posed by the ICC. The article analyses ICC 
politics impunity, and ethnic politics through the prism of Kenya’s cases before the 
ICC.  
KEYWORDS
Kenya; ICC; Africa; international criminal justice; ethnicity; tribalism; impunity; 
violence; crime; oligarchy
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